A group of mutually trusting clients outsources a computation service to a remote server, which they do not fully trust and that may be subject to attacks. The clients do not communicate with each other and would like to verify the correctness of the remote computation and the consistency of the server's responses. This paper presents the Commutative-Operation verification Protocol (COP) that ensures linearizability when the server is correct and preserves fork-linearizability in any other case. Fork-linearizability ensures that all clients that observe each other's operations are consistent in the sense that their own operations and those operations of other clients that they see are linearizable. COP goes beyond previous protocols in supporting wait-free client operations for sequences of commutative operations.
Introduction
With the advent of cloud computing, most computations run in remote data centers and no longer on local devices. As a result, users are bound to trust the service provider for the confidentiality and the correctness of their computations. This work addresses the integrity of outsourced data and computations and the consistency of the provider's responses. Consider a group of mutually trusting clients who want to collaborate on a resource that is provided by a remote minimally trusted server. This could be a wiki containing data of a common project, an archival document repository, or a groupware tool running in the cloud. A subtle change in the remote computation, whether caused inadvertently by a bug or deliberately by a malicious adversary, may result in wrong responses to the clients. Although the clients generally trust the provider, they would like to assess the integrity of the computation, to verify that responses are correct, and to check that they all get consistent responses.
In an asynchronous network model without communication among clients such as considered here, the server may perform a forking attack and omit the effects of operations by some clients in her responses to other clients. Not knowing which operations other clients execute, the latter group cannot detect such violations. The best achievable consistency guarantee in this setting is captured by forklinearizability, introduced by Mazières and Shasha [15] for storage systems. Fork-linearizability ensures that whenever the server in her responses to a client C 1 has ignored a write operation executed by a client C 2 , then C 1 can never again read a value written by C 2 afterwards and vice versa. From this property, clients can detect server misbehavior from a single inconsistent operation, which is much easier than comparing the effects of all past operations one-by-one.
Several conceptual [4, 14, 2, 3] and practical advances [19, 6, 13, 17] have recently been made that improve consistency checking and verification with fork-linearizability and related notions for remote storage and computation. The resulting protocols ensure that when the server is correct, the service is linearizable and (ideally) the algorithm is wait-free, that is, every client's operations complete independently of other clients. It has been recognized, however, that read/write conflicts often cause such protocols to block; this applies to consistency verification for storage with fork-linearizable semantics [15, 4] and for other forking consistency notions [2, 3] .
In this paper, we go beyond storage services and propose a new protocol for consistency verification of remote computations on a Byzantine server, called the Commutative-Operation verification Protocol or COP. It supports arbitrary functionalities, exploits commuting operations, and allows clients to operate concurrently and without blocking or aborting whenever feasible, while imposing fork-linearizable semantics. Through this guarantee Byzantine behavior of the server can be exposed easily. Clients may therefore verify the correctness of a service in an end-to-end way.
Support for wait-free operations is a key feature for collaboration with remote coordination, as geographically separated clients may operate with totally different timing characteristics. Consequently, previous work has devoted a lot of attention to identifying and avoiding blocking situations [15, 4, 11] . For example, read operations in a storage service commute and do not lead to a conflict. On the other hand, when a client writes to a data item concurrently with another client reading from the item, the reader has to wait until the write operation completes; otherwise, fork-linearizability is not guaranteed. If all operations are to proceed without blocking, though, it is necessary to weaken the consistency guarantees to fork-* linearizability [11] or weak fork-linearizability [3] , for instance. COP is wait-free and never blocks because it aborts non-commuting operations that cannot proceed. Abortable operations have been introduced in this context by Majuntke et al. [14] .
The Blind Stone Tablet (BST) protocol [19] supports an encrypted remote database hosted by an untrusted server that is accessed by multiple clients. Its consistency checking algorithm allows some commuting client operations to proceed concurrently, but only to a limited extent, as we explain below. Furthermore, the protocol guarantees fork-linearizability for database state updates, but does not ensure it for certain responses output by a client.
SPORC considers a groupware collaboration service whose operations may not commute, but can be made to commute by applying operational transformations. Through this mechanism, different execution orders still converge to the same state. All SPORC operations are wait-free and respect fork-* linearizability.
Contributions
This paper considers a generic service executed by an untrusted server and investigates protocols for consistency verification through fork-linearizable semantics. It explores the relation between commuting operations in the service specification and client operations that may proceed concurrently.
More concretely, this paper introduces the Commutative-Operation verification Protocol (COP) and makes three contributions:
1. COP is the first wait-free protocol that emulates an arbitrary functionality on a Byzantine server with fork-linearizability and supports commuting operation sequences. 2. COP allows clients to proceed at their own speed, regardless of the behavior of other clients, when they execute non-conflicting sequences of operations. 3. We formally prove COP correct and demonstrate that all completed operations and their responses respect fork-linearizability.
COP follows the general pattern of most previous fork-linearizable emulation protocols. For determining when to proceed with concurrent operations, it considers sequences of operations that jointly commute, in contrast to earlier protocols, which considered only isolated operations.
In COP, the server merely coordinates client-side operations but does not compute the results. This conceptually simple approach can be found in many related protocols [19, 8, 6] and practical collaboration systems (git 1 , Mercurial 2 ); it also represents the common trend of cloud computing to shift computation to the client and coordination to the cloud.
Related work
Storage protocols. Fork-linearizability has been introduced (under the name of fork consistency) together with the SUNDR storage system [15, 10] . Conceptually SUNDR operates on storage objects with simple read/write semantics. Subsequent work of Cachin et al. [4] improves the efficiency of untrusted storage protocols. A lock-free storage protocol with abortable operations, which lets all operations complete in the absence of step contention, has been proposed by Majuntke et al. [14] .
FAUST [3] and Venus [17] go beyond the fork-linearizable consistency guarantee and model occasional message exchanges among the clients. This allows FAUST and Venus to obtain stronger semantics, in the sense that they eventually reach consistency (in the sense of linearizability) or detect server misbehavior. In the model considered here, fork-linearizability is the best possible guarantee [15] .
Blind Stone Tablet (BST). The BST protocol [19] considers transactions on a common database, coordinated by the remote server. Clients first simulate a transaction on their own copy, potentially generating local output, then coordinate with the server for ordering the transaction. From the server's response the client determines if his transaction commutes with other, pending transactions invoked by different clients that were reported by the server. If they conflict, the client undoes the transaction and basically aborts; otherwise, he commits the transaction and relays it via the server to other clients. When a client receives such a relayed transaction, the client applies the transaction to its database copy.
BST has two limitations: First, because a client applies his own transactions only when all pending transactions by other clients have been applied to his own state, state changes induced by his transactions are delayed in dependence on other clients. Thus, he cannot always execute his next transaction from the modified state and obtain a correct output. Second, the notion of "trace consistency" in the analysis of the BST protocol considers only transactions that have been applied to the local state, not local output generated by the client. Hence fork-linearizability is not shown for the service responses but only for those transactions that clients have applied to their state (the former may occur long before the latter).
COP is strictly more general than BST, as it allows one client to execute multiple operations independently of the other clients, as long as his sequence of operations jointly commutes with the sequence of pending operations by other clients. Note that two operations o 1 and o 2 may independently commute with an operation o 3 from a particular starting state, but their concatenation, o 1 • o 2 , may not commute with o 3 .
Non-blocking protocols. SPORC [6] is a group collaboration system where operations do not need to be executed in the same order at every client by virtue of employing operational transforms. The latter concept allows to shift operations to a different position in an execution by transforming them according to properties of the skipped operations. Differently ordered and transformed variants of a common sequence converge to the same end state.
SPORC achieves fork-* linearizability [11] , which is closely related to weak fork-linearizability [3] ; both notions are relaxations of fork-linearizability that permit concurrent operations to proceed without blocking, such that protocols become wait-free. The increased concurrency is traded for weaker consistency, as up to one diverging operation may exist between the views of different clients and cannot be detected.
FAUST [3] , mentioned before, never blocks clients and enjoys eventual consistency, but guarantees only weak fork-linearizability.
In contrast to the SPORC and FAUST protocols, COP ensures the stronger fork-linearizability condition, where every operation is consistent as soon as it completes. SPORC is not weaker nor stronger than COP: On one hand, SPORC seems more general as it never blocks clients even for operations that do not appear to commute; on the other hand, though, SPORC only supports functions with suitably transformable operations and it has no provisions for handling conflicting operations, whereas COP works for arbitrary functions.
In all above protocols for generic services (BST, SPORC, and COP), all clients execute all operations. This is not necessary for storage protocols (SUNDR and FAUST) because their operations are simpler.
Last but not least, the protocol of Cachin [1] provides also fork-linearizable execution for generic services like COP. However, the approach is inherently blocking and requires the service to satisfy a cryptographic notion of "separated authenticated execution."
Organization of the paper
The paper continues by introducing the notation and basic concepts in Section 2. The subsequent section presents COP and Section 4 proves that COP emulates an arbitrary functionality on a Byzantine server with fork-linearizability.
Definitions
System model. We consider an asynchronous distributed system with n clients, C 1 , . . . , C n and a server S, modeled as processes. Each client is connected to the server through an asynchronous, reliable communication channel that respects FIFO order. A protocol specifies the operations of the processes. All clients are correct and follow the protocol, whereas S operates in one of two modes: either she is correct and follows the protocol or she is Byzantine and may deviate arbitrarily from the specification.
Functionality. We consider a deterministic functionality F (also called a type) defined over a set of states S and a set of operations O. F takes as arguments a state s ∈ S and an operation o ∈ O and returns a tuple (s , r), where s ∈ S is a state that reflects any changes that o caused to s and r ∈ R is a response to o:
This is also called the sequential specification of F . We extend this notation for executing a sequence of operations o 1 , . . . , o k , starting from an initial state s 0 , and write 
Furthermore, we say two operations o 1 , o 2 ∈ O commute when they commute in any state of S. Also sequences of operations can commute. Suppose two sequences ρ 1 and ρ 2 consisting of operations in O are mixed together into one sequence π such that the partial order among the operations from ρ 1 and from ρ 2 is retained in π, respectively. If executing π starting from a state s gives the same respective responses and the same final state as for every other such mixed sequence, in particular for ρ 1 • ρ 2 and for ρ 2 • ρ 1 , where • denotes concatenation, we say that ρ 1 and ρ 2 commute in state s. Analogously, we say that ρ 1 and ρ 2 commute if they commute in any state.
Operations that do not commute are said to conflict. Commuting operations have been investigated by Weihl [18] in the context of concurrency control. We define a Boolean predicate commute F (s, ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) that is true if and only if ρ 1 and ρ 2 commute in s according to F .
Abortable services. When operations of F conflict, a protocol may either decide to block or to abort. Aborting and giving the client a chance to retry the operation at his own rate has often advantages compared to blocking, which might delay an application in unexpected ways.
As in previous work [14] , we permit operations to abort and augment F to a functionality F accordingly. F is defined over the same set of states S and operations O as F , but returns a tuple defined over S and R ∪ {⊥}. F may return the same output as F , but F may also return ⊥ and leave the state unchanged, denoting that a client is not able to execute F . Hence, F is a non-deterministic relation and satisfies
Since F is not deterministic, a sequence of operations no longer uniquely determines the resulting state and response value.
Operations and histories. The clients interact with F through operations provided by F . As operations take time, they are represented by two events occurring at the client, an invocation and a response.
A history of an execution σ consists of the sequence of invocations and responses of F occurring in σ.
An operation is complete in a history if it has a matching response. An operation o precedes another operation o in a sequence of events σ, denoted o < σ o , whenever o completes before o is invoked in σ. A sequence of events π preserves the real-time order of a history σ if for every two operations o and o in π, if o < σ o then o < π o . Two operations are concurrent if neither one of them precedes the other. A sequence of events is sequential if it does not contain concurrent operations. For a sequence of events σ, the subsequence of σ consisting only of events occurring at client C i is denoted by σ| C i (we use the symbol | as a projection operator). For some operation o, the prefix of σ that ends with the last event of o is denoted by σ| o .
An operation o is said to be contained in a sequence of events σ, denoted o ∈ σ, whenever at least one event of o is in σ. We often simplify the terminology by exploiting that every sequential sequence of events corresponds naturally to a sequence of operations, and that analogously every sequence of operations corresponds to a sequential sequence of events.
An execution is well-formed if the events at each client are alternating invocations and matching responses, starting with an invocation. An execution is fair, informally, if it does not halt prematurely when there are still steps to be taken or messages to be delivered (see the standard literature for a formal definition [12] ). We are interested in a protocol where the clients never block each other. Assuming the server is correct, then every operation of a client should complete independently of the other clients, and only through steps of the client and the server. We call such a protocol wait-free.
Consistency properties. Clients interact with F via operations. Recall that every operation at a client C i is associated with an invocation and a response event that occurs at C i . We say that C i executes an operation between the corresponding invocation and completion events.
Definition 1 (View).
A sequence of events π is called a view of a history σ at a client C i w.r.t. a functionality F if:
1. π is a sequential permutation of some subsequence of complete operations in σ; 2. all complete operations executed by C i appear in π; and 3. π satisfies the sequential specification of F .
Definition 2 (Linearizability [9]).
A history σ is linearizable w.r.t. a functionality F if there exists a sequence of events π such that:
1. π is a view of σ at all clients w.r.t. F ; and 2. π preserves the real-time order of σ.
Definition 3 (Fork-linearizability [15] ). A history σ is fork-linearizable w.r.t. a functionality F if for each client C i there exists a sequence of events π i such that:
1. π i is a view of σ at C i w.r.t. F ; 2. π i preserves real-time order of σ; and 3. for every client C j and every operation o ∈ π i ∩ π j it holds that
Definition 4 (Fork-linearizable Byzantine emulation [4] ). We say that a protocol P for a set of clients emulates a functionality F on a Byzantine server S with fork-linearizability if and only if in every fair and well-formed execution of P , the sequence of events observed by the clients is fork-linearizable with respect to F , and moreover, if S is correct, then the execution is linearizable w.r.t. F .
Cryptography. In this paper, we make use of several cryptographic primitives, namely hash functions and digital signatures. A hash function hash maps a bit string x of arbitrary length to a short, unique representation of fixed length. We use a collision-free hash function; this property ensures that it is computationally infeasible to produce two different inputs x and x such that hash(x) = hash(x ). A digital signature scheme provides two operations, sign and verify. We parametrize these operations for each client C i as sign i and verify i . The invocation of sign i takes a bit string m as a parameter and returns a signature φ with the response. The verify i operation takes a string m, and a putative signature φ as parameters and returns a Boolean value. It satisfies that verify i (m, φ) is true for all i and m if and only if C i has executed sign i (m) = φ before. Only C i may invoke sign i (·), but every client and S may invoke verify i .
The commutative-operation verification protocol
The pseudocode of COP for the clients and the server is presented in Figures 1-3 . We assume that the execution of each client is well-formed and fair.
Notation. The function length(a) for a list a denotes the number of elements in a. Several variables are dynamic arrays or maps, which associate keys to values. A value is stored in a map H by assigning it to a key, denoted H[k] ← v; if no value has been assigned to a key, the map returns ⊥. Recall that F is the abortable extension of functionality F .
Overview. COP adopts the structure of previous protocols that guarantee fork-linearizable semantics [15, 19, 1] . It aims at obtaining a globally consistent order for the operations of all clients, as determined by the server.
When a client C i invokes an operation o, he sends a INVOKE message to the server S. He expects to receive a REPLY 
Client C i then verifies that the data from the server is consistent. In order to ensure fork-linearizability for his response values, the client first simulates the pending-self operations and tests if o commutes with the pending-other operations. If the test succeeds, he declares o to be successful, executes o, and computes the response r according to F ; otherwise, O is aborted and the response is r = ⊥. According to this, the status of o is either SUCCESS or ABORT. Through these steps the client commits o. Then he sends a corresponding COMMIT message to S and outputs r.
The server records the committed operation and relays it to all clients via a BROADCAST message. When the client receives such a broadcasted operation, he verifies that it is consistent with everything the server told him so far. If this verification succeeds, we say that the client confirms the operation. If the operation's status was SUCCESS, then the client executes it and applies it to his local state.
Data structures. Every client locally maintains a set of variables during the protocol. The state s ∈ S is the result of applying all successful operations, received in BROADCAST messages, to the initial state s 0 . Variable c stores the sequence number of the last operation that the client has confirmed. H is a map containing a hash chain computed over the global operation sequence as announced by S. The contents of H are indexed by the sequence number of the operations, such that entry H
Variable Z maps the sequence number of every operation that the client has executed himself to the status of the operation.
The server also keeps several variables locally. She stores the invoked operations in a map I and the completed operations in a map O, both indexed by the operations' sequence numbers. Variable t determines the global sequence number for the invoked operations. Finally, variable b is the sequence number of the last broadcasted operation and ensures that S disseminates operations to clients in the global order.
Protocol. When client C i invokes an operation o, he stores it in u and sends an INVOKE message to S containing o, c, and τ , a digital signature computed over o and i. In turn, a correct S sends a REPLY message with the list ω of pending operations; they have a sequence number greater than c. Upon 
// compute temporary state with successful pending-self operations receiving a REPLY message, the client checks that ω is consistent with any previously sent operations and uses ω to assemble the successful pending-self operations µ and the pending-other operations γ. He then determines whether o can be executed or has to be aborted.
In particular, during the loop in Algorithm 1, for every operation o in ω, C i determines its sequence number l and verifies that o was indeed invoked by C j from the digital signature. He computes the entry of o in the hash chain from o itself, l, j, and H[l − 1]. If H[l] = ⊥, then C i stores the hash value there. Otherwise, if H[l] has already been set, C i verifies that the hash values are equal; this means that o is consistent with the pending operation(s) that S has sent previously with indices up to l.
If operation o is his own and its saved status in Z[l] was SUCCESS, then he appends it to µ. The client remembers the status of his own operations in Z, since commute F depends on the state and that could have changed if he applied operations after committing o.
Finally, when C i reaches the end of ω (i.e., when C i considers o = u), he checks that ω is not empty and that it contains o at the last position. He then creates a temporary state a by applying µ to the current state s, and tests whether o commutes with the pending-other operations γ in a. Upon receiving a COMMIT message for an operation o with a sequence number q, the server records its content as O[q] in the map of committed operations. Then she is supposed to send a BROADCAST message containing O[q] to the clients. She waits with this until she has received COMMIT messages for all operations with sequence number less than q and broadcasted them. This ensures that completed operations are disseminated in the global order to all clients. Note that this does not forbid clients from progressing with their own operations as we explain below.
In a BROADCAST message received by client C i , the committed operation is represented by a tuple (o, q, h, z, φ, j). He conducts several verification steps before confirming the operation o and applying it to his state s. First, he verifies that the sequence number q is the next operation according to his variable c, hence, o follows the global order and the server did not omit any operations. Second, he uses the digital signature φ on the information in the message to verify that the client C j indeed committed o. Lastly, the client computes his own hash-chain entry H[q] for o and confirms that it is equal to the hash-chain value h from the message. This ensures that C i and C j have received consistent operations from S up to o. Once the verification succeeds, the client applies o to his state s only if its status z was SUCCESS, that is, when C j has not aborted o.
Memory requirements. For saving storage space, the client may garbage-collect entries of H and Z with sequence numbers smaller than c. The server can also save space by removing the entries in I and O for the operations that she has broadcast. However, if new clients are allowed to enter the protocol, the server should keep all operations in O and broadcast them to new clients upon their arrival.
With the above optimizations the client has to keep only pending operations in H and pending-self operations in Z. The same holds for the server: the maximum number of entries stored in I and O is proportional to the number of pending operations at any client.
Communication. Every operation executed by a client requires him to perform one roundtrip to the server: send an INVOKE message and receive a REPLY. For every executed operation the server simply sends a BROADCAST message. Clients do not communicate with each other in the protocol. However, as soon as they do, they benefit from fork-linearizability and can easily discover a forking attack by comparing their hash chains.
Messages 4 Analysis Theorem 1. The commutative-operation verification protocol in Figures 1-3 emulates functionality F on a Byzantine server with fork-linearizability.
We prove this theorem through a sequence of lemmas in the remainder of this section. We start by introducing additional notation.
When a client issues a COMMIT signature for some operation o, we say that he commits o. The client's sequence number included in the signature thus becomes the sequence number of o; note that with a faulty S, two different operations may be committed with the same sequence number by separate clients.
Lemma 2.
If the server is correct, then every history σ is linearizable w.r.t. F . Moreover, if the clients execute all operations sequentially, then σ is linearizable w.r.t. F .
Proof. Recall that σ consists of invocation and response events. We construct a sequential permutation π of σ in terms of the operations associated to the events in σ. Note that a client sends an INVOKE message with his operation to the server, the server assigns a sequence number to the operation and sends it back. The client then computes the response and sends a signed COMMIT message to S, containing the operation and its sequence number. Since each executed operation appears in σ in terms of its invocation and response events, π contains all operations of all clients.
We order π by the sequence number of the operations. If the server is correct she processes INVOKE messages in the order they are received and assigns sequence numbers accordingly. This implies that if an operation o is invoked after an operation o completes, then the sequence number of o is higher than o's. Hence, π preserves the real-time order of σ.
We now use induction on the operations in π to show that π satisfies the sequential specification of F . Note that F requires a bit of care, as it is not deterministic. For a sequence ω of operations of F in an actual execution, we write successful(ω) for the subsequence whose status was SUCCESS; restricted to such operations, F is deterministic. In particular, consider some operation o ∈ π, executed by client C i . We want to show that C i computes (s , r) such that (s , r) ∈ F (s 0 , successful(π| o )), whereby it outputs r after committing o and stores s in its variable s after applying o.
Consider the base case where o is the first operation in π. Note that S has not reported any pending operations to C i because o is the first operation. Thus, C i determines that the status of o is SUCCESS, computes (s , r) ← F (s 0 , o) and outputs r. Hence, F is satisfied. When C i later receives o in the BROADCAST message from S with sequence number 1, the state is also updated correctly. Now consider the case when o is not the first operation in π and assume that the induction assumption holds for an operation that appears in π before o. If the status of o is ABORT, then the client does not invoke F , returns ⊥, and leaves the state unchanged upon applying o. The claim follows.
Otherwise, we need to show that the response r = ⊥ and the state s after applying o satisfy (s , r) = F (s 0 , successful(π| o )). Since S is correct, she assigns unique sequence numbers to the operations. We split the operations with a sequence number smaller than that of o in three groups: a sequence ρ of operations that C i has confirmed before he committed o, this sequence is in the order in which C i confirmed these operations; a sequence δ of operations of other clients that were reported by S as pending to C i when executing o, ordered as in the REPLY message; and a sequence ν of operations that C i has committed itself before o but not yet confirmed or applied, ordered by their sequence number.
Observe that C i computes r starting from its own copy of the states that results after applying all operations in successful(ρ). From the induction assumption, it follows that (s, ·) = F (s 0 , successful(ρ)) because ρ is a prefix of π. From variable ω in the REPLY message, C i computes the pending-other operations γ and the successful pending-self operations µ. Note that γ = δ and µ = successful(ν) as the server is correct. The client computes a temporary state (a, ·) = F (s, µ). Because o does not abort, C i has determined that o commutes with γ in a and computed (·, r) = F (a, o). By the definition of commuting operation sequences, we have that (s , r) = F (a, successful(γ) • o) and (s , r) = F (s, successful(ω)) since the order of operations in µ and γ is preserved in ω. Hence, (s , r) = F (s 0 , successful(π| o )).
The sequence π preserves the real-time order of σ and satisfies the three conditions of a view of σ at every client C i w.r.t. F , hence, σ is linearizable w.r.t. F .
The second part of the lemma claims that if clients execute operations sequentially, then no client outputs ⊥. Since the sequence of events at every client is well-formed, a client does not invoke an operation before he has completed the previous one. Moreover, if clients execute operations sequentially then no client invokes an operation while there is a client who has not completed his operation. Hence, the server never includes any pending operations in ω of the REPLY message. The check for conflicts is never positive, and all operations have status SUCCESS. Hence, no client returns ⊥ and σ satisfies the sequential specification of F .
The promised view of an operation. Suppose a client C i executes and thereby commits an operation o. We define the promised view to C i of o as the sequence of all operations that C i has confirmed before committing o, concatenated with the sequence ω of pending operations received in the REPLY message during the execution of o, including o itself (according to the protocol C i verifies that the last operation in ω is o). Consider the moment when C i receives the REPLY message during the execution of o. The view of o promised to C i contains the sequence of operations that C i has confirmed, followed by the list ω in the REPLY message, including o.
For every pending operation p ∈ ω, client C i checks if he has already an entry in H at index l, which is the promised sequence number of p to C i according to ω. If there is no such entry, he computes the hash value H[l] as above. Otherwise, C i must have received an operation for sequence number l earlier, and so he verifies that o is the same pending operation as received before. Moreover, C i verifies that his last invoked operation is also returned to him as pending and adds it to H. Hence, the new hash value h stored in H at the sequence number of o represents the promised view to C i of o.
Subsequently, C i signs o and h together and sends it to the server. Client C j receives it in a BROAD-CAST message from S, to be confirmed and applied with sequence number q. Because C j verifies the signature of C i on o, q, and h, the hash value h received by C j represents the promised view to C i of o. Before C j applies o as his q-th operation, according to the protocol he must have already confirmed q − 1 operations one by one. Client C j also verifies that he has either already computed the same The first additional claim follows simply by noticing that the statement of the lemma holds for i = j. For showing the second additional claim, we note that if C i confirms an operation of himself, then he has previously executed it (successful or not). There may be additional operations that C i has executed but not yet confirmed, but C i has verified according to the above argument that these were all contained in ω from the REPLY message. Thus they are also in the promised view of o.
The view of a client. We construct a sequence π i from σ as follows. Let o be the operation committed by C i which has the highest sequence number among those operations of C i that have been confirmed by some client C k (including C i ). Define α i to be the sequence of operations confirmed by C k up to and including o. Furthermore, let β i be the sequence of operations committed by C i with a sequence number higher than that of o. Then π i is the concatenation of α i and β i . Observe that by definition, no client has confirmed operations from β i .
Lemma 4.
The sequence π i is a view of σ at C i w.r.t. F . Proof. Note that π i is defined through a sequence of operations that are contained in σ. Hence π i is sequential by construction.
We now argue that all operations executed by C i are included in π i . Recall that π i = α i • β i and consider o, the last operation in α i . As o has been confirmed by C k , Lemma 3 shows that α i is equal to the promised view to C i of o and, furthermore, that it contains all operations that C i has executed up to o. By construction of π i all other operations executed by C i are contained in β i , and the property follows.
The last property of a view requires that π i satisfies the sequential specification of F . Note that F is not deterministic and some responses might be ⊥. But when we ensure that two operation sequences of F have responses equal to ⊥ in exactly the same positions, then we can conclude that two equal operation sequences give the same resulting state and responses from the fact that F is deterministic.
We first address the operations in α i . Consider again o, the last operation in α i , which has been confirmed by C k . For the point in time when C i executes o, define ρ to be the sequence of operations that C i has confirmed prior to this and defines as the resulting state from applying the successful operations in ρ, as stored in variable s; furthermore, let ω be the pending operations contained in the REPLY message from S. Observe that ω can be partitioned in the pending-other operations γ, the successful pending-self operations of C i as stored in µ, the aborted pending-self operations of C i , and o. Client C i computes the response r for o in state a that results from F (s, µ). Before executing o, C i verifies that o commutes with γ in a. Note that when C i committed some operation p ∈ µ he has also verified that p commuted with the pending-other operations in ω| p . Hence, the response resulting from executing the operations in ρ followed by µ • o is the same as that resulting from executing µ • successful(γ) • o after ρ (recall the notation successful(·) from Lemma 2). Since ω preserves the order of operations in µ and γ, the response is also the same after the execution of ρ • successful(ω). Moreover, the state resulting from executing the operations in ρ followed by µ • successful(γ) • o is the same as that resulting from executing ρ • successful(ω). Since ρ • ω is the promised view to C i of o, and since C k has confirmed o, Lemma 3 now implies that ρ • ω is equal to α i .
To conclude the argument, we only have to show that the abort status for all operations in the sequences is the same. Then they will produce the same responses and the same final state. Note that when C i executes some operation o he either computes a response according to F or aborts the operation, declaring its status to be SUCCESS or ABORT, respectively. For operations in ρ this is clear from the protocol as the status is included in the BROADCAST message. And whenever C i later obtains o again as a pending-self operation in ω at some index l, he verifies that it is the same operation as previously at index l and applies or skips it as before according to the status remembered in Z [l] . Hence, the responses of C i from executing the operations in α i respect the specification of F .
The remainder of π i consists of β i , whose operations C i executes himself using F . Hence, π i satisfies the sequential specification of F . Proof. Let δ k denote the sequence of operations that C k has confirmed up to o 2 . According to the protocol logic, δ k contains o 1 , and o 1 has a smaller sequence number than o 2 . Lemma 3 shows that δ k is equal to the promised view to C k of o 2 , hence, o 1 is in the promised view to C k of o 2 . Recall that the promised view contains operations that have been committed or are pending for other clients. Hence, o 1 has been invoked before o 2 completed.
Lemma 6. The sequence π i preserves the real-time order of σ.
Proof.
Recall that π i = α i • β i and consider first those operations of π i that appear in α i , that is, they have been confirmed by some client C k . Lemma 5 shows that these operations preserve the real-time order of σ. Second, the operations in β i are ordered according to their sequence number and they were committed by C i . According to the protocol, C i executes only one operation at a time and always assigns a sequence number that is higher than the previous one. Hence, β i also preserves the real-time order of σ.
We are left to show that no operation in β i precedes an operation from α i in σ. Recall that α i is the promised view to C i of o (the last operation in α i ) and includes the operations that C i has confirmed or received as pending from S after C i invoked o. Since o precedes all operations from β i , it follows that no operation in α i precedes an operation from β i .
Proof. As π i = α i • β i and π j = α j • β j , we need to consider four cases to analyze all operations that can appear in π i ∩ π j and the rest are symmetrical.
Conclusion
This paper has introduced the Commutative-Operation verification Protocol (COP), which allows a group of clients to execute a generic service coordinated by a remote untrusted server. COP ensures fork-linearizability and allows clients to easily verify the consistency and integrity of the service responses. In contrast to previous work, COP is wait-free and supports commuting operation sequences, but may sometimes abort conflicting operations.
Given the popularity of outsourced computation and the cloud-computing model, the problem of checking the integrity of remote computations has received a lot of attention recently [7, 5, 16] . But such cryptographic protocols typically address only a two-party model with a single client. Combining them with COP or other protocols that guarantee fork-linearizability will represent an important step toward a comprehensive consistency-verification solutions for realistic distributed systems.
